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Editor’s Note
The Disputatio for this issue involves the value pluralism and its relevance for 
public administration. The three participants are knowledgeable scholars and the 
topic an important one. Don’t miss a chance to become better informed on this 
important philosophical concept and the contention surrounding its applicability 
and relevance for public administration. 
Abstract
In philosophical ethics, value pluralism is the idea, often associated with Isaiah 
Berlin, that there are many objective, conflicting, even incommensurable values 
and that this necessitates often tragic moral choices. Several administrative 
theorists (notably Wagenaar and Spicer) have argued that value pluralism has far-
reaching implications for public administration. The cogency of their arguments 
is, however, questionable. This article critically examines the uses of value 
pluralism in administrative theory and concludes that its claimed implications are 
neither valid, nor exhaustive, nor congruent. Hence, the implications of value 
pluralism for public administration (if any) remain open to debate.
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A Meta-Ethical Notion in Administrative Theory
Value pluralism (VP) is a notion in philosophical ethics. VP states, roughly 
speaking, that there are multiple intrinsic values, some of which conflict in 
principle and often also in concrete situations (a familiar example is liberty 
vs. equality), and that no easy choice between them is possible. VP describes 
the structure of our “moral universe”; it is a position in meta-ethics, more 
specifically in axiology (Chang, 2001, p. 16139; Mason, 2011). Importantly, 
VP does not imply the sociological claim of heterogeneity in moral out-
looks in the (modern) world, but deals with the structure of morality per se 
(Mason, 2011).
Such a highly abstract idea might seem to have little pertinence for the 
practically oriented field of public administration. In recent years, however, 
several public administration scholars have claimed that VP does have a 
profound significance for answering fundamental questions in the field. 
The two most explicit and philosophically best informed of these are argu-
ably Hendrik Wagenaar and Michael W. Spicer. Briefly put, they have 
appealed to VP to argue for a practice-based approach to administrative 
ethics and an interpretive approach to policy analysis (Wagenaar, 1999, 
2002, 2011) and to criticize New Public Management and Reinventing 
Government, to adapt public administration to postmodern conditions, and 
to defend the political involvement of public administrators (Spicer, 2001, 
2004, 2005b, 2010).
So far, other administrative theorists have not bothered to probe these claims 
about VP and its supposed implications.1 Examining them seems, however, 
highly relevant for our field, if only because it is far from evident how a meta-
ethical assumption about the existence of a plurality of conflicting values leads 
to specific recommendations for administrative thought and practice. Hence, it 
is first of all a question of theoretical significance whether VP does indeed have 
implications for public administration and whether they are the ones claimed. 
But probing the claims is relevant for administrative practice, too, because VP 
is presented as an established moral truth with far-reaching implications for 
practitioners (public servants, policy analysts, and others). It is prudent, there-
fore, to assess whether these implications do indeed follow.
Our primary goal is not so much polemical or practical as theoretical: We 
want to better understand the implications of VP for the study and practice of 
public administration and as a means to that end we critically examine the 
claims made by Wagenaar and Spicer. To lay a proper groundwork for our 
argument, we first offer an exploration of the concept of VP as it has been 
developed in philosophical ethics in the next section. Then follows an expli-
cation of the way VP is used in public administration theory, particularly by 
 at Universiteit Leiden \ LUMC on October 13, 2014aas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
988 Administration & Society 46(8)
Wagenaar and Spicer (the “VP in Administrative Theory” section). In the 
“Evaluation” section, a critical assessment of their arguments is given, start-
ing with the most general problematic aspects and descending to more spe-
cific issues. In the concluding section, we argue for a more cautious view of 
the implications VP (if assumed) may and may not have for the study and 
practice of public administration.
VP: Five Claims
In philosophical ethics, the main features of VP are fairly clear, although 
many debates continue to surround it (cf. Kekes, 1993). Our intention in this 
section is not to give anything close to an exhaustive treatment, but only to 
develop an account of VP and related issues that is sufficiently elaborate for 
understanding its applications in administrative theory. In advance, we must 
note that this account draws heavily on the work of Isaiah Berlin, who is 
commonly regarded the most important advocate of VP in Anglo–American 
philosophy (e.g., Cherniss & Hardy, 2010; Crowder, 2002; Gray, 1996; 
Hausheer, 1980, 1998; Williams, 1978; Williams, 1981, p. 71). Through his 
writings in political theory and the history of ideas, Berlin offers an inspira-
tion to most later theorists of VP, including those in the study of public 
administration (e.g., Spicer, 2005a, 2008).
As is the case with most philosophical ideas, the literature contains 
thicker and thinner conceptualizations of VP. The most comprehensive 
meaning of VP, which is also the one closest to Berlin’s understanding and 
which is in large part that of Wagenaar and Spicer as well, can be understood 
as a construct of five claims, stating (a) that there is a plurality of different 
values, (b) that are objective, (c) inevitably conflicting, (d) even incommen-
surable, and (e) that this demands trade-offs or radical choice. Let us expli-
cate each of these claims more fully.
a. As said before, VP is a descriptive notion in the field of meta-ethics. Its 
first and simplest idea is that there exists a plurality of genuine moral 
values. They are not, or not only, of instrumental value, that is, they are 
not valuable merely because they serve some other, higher goals, but 
they are basic, intrinsic, and ultimate.2 Moreover, they cannot be 
reduced to some overarching general value, at least not without losing 
their own distinct worth. The different values are all fundamentally good 
in themselves (Berlin, 1998a; Berlin, 1998b, especially pp. 237-242; 
Berlin, 2002a; cf. Gray, 1996, especially Chapter 2; Mason, 2011; 
Williams, 1978, 1981). To be sure, there may be values that have 
primarily instrumental worth, but there is also a class of intrinsic 
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values. Berlin postulates the existence of a great number of ultimate 
values, distributed across many different value systems, including our 
own (Berlin, 1980, 1998a, 1998c, 1998d; Berlin, 2002b, especially 
pp. 11-14; Cherniss & Hardy, 2010, §4; Gray, 1996, Chapter 2).
b. Second, the ultimate values postulated by Berlin (2002a) are purport-
edly all “objective.” The ultimate values are objective because “their 
nature, the pursuit of them, is part of what it is to be a human being, 
and this is an objective given” (p. 12). They are the moral ends that 
people can pursue “and still be fully rational, fully men” (Berlin, 
1998a, p. 9). Berlin emphasizes this objectivity of values to differenti-
ate his theory from what he calls “relativism.” Because values are 
objective, relativist views of morality are mistaken. This way of dis-
tinguishing VP from relativism by affirming the objective worth of 
values has become a common move in the VP literature (cf. Bellamy, 
1999, p. 4; Bellamy, 2000, p. 189; Kekes, 1993, pp. 48-52; Kekes, 
1997, p. 162).
c. The third and most important element of VP is the idea that many of 
these intrinsic, objective values inevitably conflict with one another. 
This claim goes beyond the commonsensical notion that value con-
flict can be experienced in practical situations (and often only at first 
sight). VP is not merely an experiential but a metaphysical claim. It 
states that many genuine, intrinsic values clash in principle, whether 
we experience it or not. Conflict between values is not contingent, but 
irremovable, permanent; conflict is inevitably associated with the 
very concept of values (Berlin, 1998a; Berlin, 1998b, pp. 237-242; 
Berlin, 2002a, pp. 212-217; Berlin, 2002b; Gray, 1996, pp. 54-55). 
Berlin (1998a) thus emphasizes the continuous and inevitable emer-
gence of conflicts between objective values. Moreover, these con-
flicts are often irresolvable (p. 10). Value conflict can take place 
between values of different value systems (e.g., in religious conflicts) 
but also between values that are part of the same value system (e.g., 
in modern Western morality). As a consequence, value conflict occurs 
on multiple social levels, between various types of human collectives 
and individuals. It occurs even at the personal level, within a single 
individual’s moral consciousness (Berlin, 1998a, p. 10). Hence, value 
conflict experienced by people is real and not merely the product of a 
flawed understanding of moral reality. Deeper analysis shall never 
reveal that the values involved in such moral conflicts could, in fact, 
be harmoniously combined (cf. Williams, 1981, especially pp. 73-76). 
The disharmony between values is, in John Gray’s (1996) apt phrase, 
a matter of “moral scarcity” (p. 44).
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d. Although the notion of value conflict is clearly the most central ele-
ment of VP, most VP theorists go at least one step further and claim 
that each of these conflicting values also contains an idiosyncratic 
kind of goodness which precludes a valid measure or standard to 
compare their moral worth. This is called the incommensurability of 
values. There is much debate in the literature on whether VP necessar-
ily implies incommensurability and whether incommensurability pre-
cludes rational choices between basic values (Berlin & Williams, 
1994; Crowder, 1994; Hsieh, 2008; Mason, 2011, §4; Williams, 1981, 
pp. 76-70; Cherniss & Hardy, 2010, §4.4). Are rational choices 
between values still possible when their conflicts are, in the words of 
Crowder (1994), “clashes of absolutes”? (p. 295). And if VP goes “all 
the way down” in morality, so to speak, and there is no specifiable 
higher good to which various conflicting values contribute, does then 
reason lack all guidance in the choice between them (cf. Mason, 2011, 
§§4-5)? Indeed, how can values clash at all if they are of fundamen-
tally different orders? The aim of the present discussion is not to 
resolve these thorny issues of incommensurability and the possibility 
for rational choice between values in the case of VP. The important 
point for us is that incommensurability is believed to make already 
difficult situations of value conflict even more problematic.
e. A final element that is often (though not necessarily) added to the 
previous four is that efforts to do good necessitate radical, often tragic 
choices and trade-offs between values. As Berlin (1998a) argues, “We 
are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable 
loss” (p. 11). Moral decisions are needed, not constantly but surely 
often. To do good means realizing values, but if different values con-
flict and cannot all be realized simultaneously, a choice must be 
made—and will inevitably be made in our actions. For many adher-
ents of VP, moral choice entails realizing the conflicting values only 
in part (if trade-offs are possible) or choosing exclusively one instead 
of another. In either case, moral choice goes with a painful sense of 
loss—the “agony of choice” (Nieuwenburg, 2004).
Value Monism Rejected
The opposite of VP is value monism (VM). VM is the idea that there exists 
an underlying harmony or unity, rather than conflict, of values. Berlin argued 
fervently against VM and the moral and political doctrines he associated with 
it (Berlin, 1998b, pp. 237-242; Berlin, 2002b, pp. 5-7). Variants of VM that 
are distinguished include Platonism, Kantianism (because it recognizes a 
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“canonical principle for ranking values”), and Utilitarianism (which posits 
that values are all “translatable” into a common value of utility and ultimately 
happiness; Kekes, 1993, pp. 63-75). Whatever exact form VM takes, its core 
tenet is the denial of inherent value conflict. Instead, adherents of VM 
maintain that all morally dilemmas can be resolved in principle (although 
probably never in practice, nor in our experience).
Value pluralists use different arguments for their claim that VP is a better 
account of the structure of values than VM. Their main argument is that VP, 
and not VM, is congruent with our common and “everyday” moral experi-
ence (Mason, 2011; Williams, 1981). Berlin (1998b), for example, uses this 
phenomenological argument: “The world that we encounter in ordinary expe-
rience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ulti-
mate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of some of which must 
inevitably involve the sacrifice of others” (pp. 238-239). Value pluralists 
argue that in the course of our lives (and particularly when we are involved in 
public decision making), we encounter deep conflicts between different val-
ues that all appear to have intrinsic moral worth, but cannot all be realized 
simultaneously. And more or deeper reflection could never show a way in 
which the values can be combined. Many value pluralists add to this that the 
deep moral regret people often experience after making a—by all accounts—
responsible choice between values should be taken as evidence for VP. We 
experience regret when one value is sacrificed for another. The failure to 
realize the sacrificed value feels as moral failure (Berlin, 1998a, pp. 10-11, 
14-16; Berlin, 1998b, pp. 239-242; Berlin, 2002b, pp. 21-23; cf. Mason, 
2011, §§2.2, 4.4; Williams, 1981). Hence, value pluralists argue, our ordinary 
moral experience of conflict and loss grant VP its plausibility over VM 
(Kekes, 1993, pp. 54-55).
Often, and certainly by Berlin, a further important reason is given to reject 
VM, a reason that still echoes in current debates on VP and VM, also in the 
field of public administration. This is the claim that VM justifies repressive 
politics and violence to achieve a political order in which the disharmony of 
values does not exist (or rather, from the VP perspective, is not acknowledged). 
Berlin regarded VM a basic principle of the totalitarian movements in the 20th 
century (Berlin, 1998a, pp. 12-14; Berlin, 1998b; Berlin, 2002b, pp. 5-23; 
Cherniss & Hardy, 2010, §§4.1, 4.3; Gray, 1996, pp. 21-22). The argument here 
is that VM feeds the utopian hope on a society in which all true values are har-
moniously realized (what Berlin called, not without drama, “a final solution” to 
moral disagreement). If a morally perfect society would be possible, this would 
legitimate violent politics to create such a utopia (Berlin, 1998a, p. 13).
One could, of course, dispute the cogency of these two arguments against 
VM. One could wonder, for instance, whether ordinary moral experience is 
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reliable enough to decide the fundamental meta-ethical debate about the 
structure of values. And one could question the mechanism by which a belief 
in VM is said to result in violence and dictatorship. In the remainder of this 
article, we will however not attempt to settle these debates, but, assuming that 
VP is correct, inquire which implications it is claimed to have for public 
administration and whether these claims are warranted.
VP in Administrative Theory
As students of public administration have often noted, administrators have to 
deal with multiple values and therefore experience moral conflicts and dilem-
mas (e.g., Denhardt, 1988; O’Kelly & Dubnick, 2006). To describe this 
widely known experience, some administrative theorists have employed the 
concept or rather the term of VP. In such cases, the term is mostly used col-
loquially and without reference to its established meaning in moral philoso-
phy (e.g., Langford, 2004, pp. 442-443; Van der Wal & Van Hout, 2009). 
Such uses of the term do not concern us here. Rather, we are interested in 
more theoretical claims about the implications of meta-ethical VP for admin-
istrative theory and practice. Two authors who have made such claims explic-
itly are Wagenaar and Spicer.
Wagenaar’s Argument
As mentioned in the introduction, Hendrik Wagenaar has elaborated on the 
implications of VP in an article (Wagenaar, 1999) and two book chapters 
(Wagenaar, 2002, 2011). To start with the last of these, in his book Meaning in 
Action (2011), he discusses pluralism in general as a condition with which pol-
icy analysts have to reckon. He distinguishes between ontological, ethical, and 
political pluralism (Wagenaar, 2011, pp. 289-294) and relates VP to the second 
of these: “Value pluralism is an ethical theory and consequently it moves in the 
rarefied realm of abstract philosophical argument” (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 294). It 
is “one of the key characteristics of values,” Wagenaar (2011) holds, “that they 
ineluctably and irredeemably clash” (p. 292). Referring to the work of Kekes, 
he adds, “Moral or value pluralism postulates that a good life requires the real-
ization of different values that in their practical consequences, inevitably, con-
flict or exclude each other” (p. 292). In the earlier book chapter, Wagenaar 
(2002) describes VP as follows: “Value pluralism describes the condition in 
which conceptions of desirable social states are plural and in which the realiza-
tion of these conceptions mutually exclude each other” (p. 112).
So VP refers to value conflict, but not all value conflicts are equally prob-
lematic. Wagenaar (1999) discerns between simple, even trivial cases of 
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value conflict that are of little consequence and hardly distressing on the one 
hand and a special class of really problematic or “genuine” value conflicts on 
the other (p. 443). Cases of the latter, he claims, are characterized by the fact 
that “the values involved are both incompatible and incommensurable” 
(Wagenaar, 2010, pp. 292-293; cf. Wagenaar, 1999, p. 443). He then explains 
these two core concepts. Two values are incompatible when they cannot be 
realized together; they are inherently conflicting (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 292). 
Regarding the more difficult concept of incommensurability, Wagenaar (2011) 
says, “Incommensurability arises when no common denominator or overriding 
value exists to which we can reduce conflicting claims” (p. 292; cf. Wagenaar, 
1999, pp. 443-444; Wagenaar, 2002, pp. 114-115). “A sure signal,” in his view, 
“that some conflict is the result of the incommensurability of the values 
involved is the aforesaid experience of loss” (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 293).
So Wagenaar does not claim that all values are incompatible and incom-
mensurable—only that certain combinations of values in specific contexts 
are. Such cases of “genuine” value conflict, in which conflicting values are 
both incompatible and incommensurable, are fundamentally irresolvable:
In such cases it is difficult to find an easy way out. No compromise, appeal to 
higher-order values or fixation on desired outcomes, or conversely, no denial of 
the conflict by reducing it to mere emotions or passions, will make it go away. 
There simply is no common ground in these cases from which to arbitrate 
rationally between the conflicting values. Conflict in such situations seems 
unavoidable. (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 293)
Wagenaar (1999) claims the notion of VP is particularly important for the 
study of public administration, because “moral disagreement, not moral har-
mony, is the overriding quality of contemporary political and administrative 
life” (p. 442). VP is also “highly pertinent to policy making” because “[m]ost 
policy issues center on situations that involve irreconcilable goals.” 
Administrators are confronted, he claims, with genuine value conflict on an 
almost daily basis: “Value conflict is inherent in program administration” (p. 
444). Given this view, Wagenaar is sometimes surprisingly optimistic about 
the possibilities for coping with VP. He states, for instance, that “resolving 
value conflict is an intrinsic part of administrative life” (p. 444) and that “[g]
ood program design facilitates good choices or at the very least prevents 
impossible situations” (p. 444). But as a value pluralist, he does maintain, of 
course, that value conflict can never be completely resolved. Value monist 
tendencies to think so are a dangerous chimera.
But if VP is the case (regardless how deep and irresolvable the value 
conflicts really are), then what are its implications for public administra-
tion? According to Wagenaar, they are twofold, pertaining first of all to 
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administrative ethics (the 1999 article and the 2002 chapter) and then also 
to policy analysis and policy making (the 2011 book). As regards the for-
mer, Wagenaar (1999) states explicitly that “value pluralism should be the 
starting point of administrative ethics” (p. 441). He distinguishes between 
a rule-based orientation and a practice-based orientation toward adminis-
trative ethics (Wagenaar, 2002, p. 111ff.). The former refers to attempts to 
guide discretionary administrative action by means of a coherent set of 
moral principles developed through rational deliberation. This is impossi-
ble, Wagenaar believes, because we will never be able to find such a set, not 
merely because of the limits of reason, but because of the recurring clash of 
values. His proposal, instead, is to adopt a practice-based orientation 
and look more to how administrators deal with moral dilemmas in everyday 
practice. They work intuitively, on the basis of their experience, in concrete 
and varying practical settings (Wagenaar, 1999, pp. 445-447; cf. Wagenaar, 
2002, pp. 118-120). Hence, he argues for pragmatic strategies to deal 
with VP:
As the examples from administrative life make clear, value conflict in everyday 
administrative situations is “dealt with” rather than resolved. “Dealing with” 
may involve many different things: evenhanded exposition of the situation, 
making general declarative statements, introspection, soul searching, 
painstaking inquiry to obtain the relevant facts, even subterfuge and calculating 
behavior. (Wagenaar, 1999, p. 447; cf. Wagenaar, 2002, pp. 125-126)
Such a practice-based approach should be stimulated not only to make 
administrative scientists better understand how public administration really 
works but also to improve the ways in which administrators themselves deal 
with value diversity. At any rate, they should stop trying to develop compre-
hensive and coherent ethical theories.
In his 2011 book, Wagenaar claims that VP also has profound implications 
for policy analysis and policy making (in his interpretative approach, the 
divide between the two becomes rather fluid). For policy analysts and policy 
makers VP is a condition to be reckoned with. In his view, VP is best internal-
ized by what he calls interpretive policy analysis (IPA). When compared with 
more traditional empiricist policy analysis (EPA), which is premised on the 
positivistic epistemology of rational problem-solving, it turns out that IPA 
performs much better in terms of dealing with “complexity,” with the factor 
of “emerging time,” and with “deep value differences” (Wagenaar, 2011, pp. 
295-296). This goes specifically for what he calls dialogical IPA (in contrast 
to hermeneutic and discursive IPA) because dialogical IPA “brings different 
perspectives on the issue together” and has an “actionable, pragmatic, situ-
ated nature” (p. 296). Indeed, it works so well that Wagenaar (2011) suggests 
it can almost resolve the very difficulty of genuine value conflict:
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It is a widely shared observation that people who disagree on general principles 
are very well able to agree on practical recommendations in concrete cases . . . 
Pragmatic strategies of accommodating complexity, emerging time, and deep 
value differences are obviously not foolproof. The point is a different one. An 
actionable, dialogical approach sets the conditions for practical judgment; it 
makes room for the play of wisdom in public affairs. This, ultimately, is the 
decisive difference between representation and dialogue, between method and 
heuristic. (p. 297)
The superiority of (dialogical) IPA does not mean that the other approaches 
have no value. According to Wagenaar (2011), they are “complementary . . . 
in the sense that each has something unique to contribute, something that is 
not reducible to one of the other variants, to policy analysis” (p. 297). 
Nevertheless, it is clear that, for him, a greater recognition of the contribu-
tions of IPA is necessitated by the reality of VP.
Spicer’s Argument
An even more extensive defense of VP in public administration than 
Wagenaar’s is given by Michael W. Spicer. He argues that mainstream admin-
istrative science mostly ignores the pluralistic nature of values and the post-
modern condition of the Western society, which shows an increasing 
fragmentation of society in terms of political and ethical outlooks (Spicer, 
2005b, pp. 670-675; cf. Spicer, 2001). Instead, public administration enquiry 
in the mold of “conventional positivist social science” takes a “monist” per-
spective that sees public administration “as an apolitical instrument, designed 
and run with the assistance of science and experts for the efficient and effec-
tive accomplishment of some given set of ends” (Spicer, 2001, p. 519). Spicer 
argues that this view reduces the relevance of administrative science for prac-
titioners, who (due to VP) have to deal with value conflict in their profes-
sional lives. The dominant monist approach is even dangerous, because it 
justifies a role for public administration as a mere tool for powerful political 
groups trying to impose their values on society (Spicer, 2001, pp. 519-521). 
If administrative science wants to reckon with VP, it should rely less on posi-
tivism with its instrumental rationalist focus, and orient itself more on the 
study of history and political philosophy, because these disciplines help 
understand the values that administrators have to deal with (Spicer, 2005b, 
pp. 684-686; cf. Spicer, 2008). Against the “monist” view of the role of 
administrators, Spicer defends what he calls the “constitutionalist” approach. 
In this view, administrators should have a significant degree of independence 
to take many values into consideration when forming and implementing pol-
icy. Such administrative independence would hinder political leaders who 
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want to impose their values on society. The ability of administrators to impose 
their own values should be restricted by a measure of administrative juridifi-
cation (Spicer, 2001, pp. 521-524).
Spicer (2010) further adapted and elaborated these arguments about the 
administrative implications of VP in a monograph titled In Defense of Politics 
in Public Administration: A Value Pluralist Perspective. Although sometimes 
a bit unsystematic, the book’s argument can be reconstructed as a set of four 
claims, stating that VP is a fact; that it implies normative (political) principles 
to promote inclusivity, personal liberty, and civil peace; that these principles 
are met when the state observes methods of peaceful conflict resolution and 
procedural justice; and finally that these methods should also be maintained 
and expanded in public administration. This is the “politics in public admin-
istration” from the title that he ultimately defends. Let us examine these steps 
in Spicer’s argument more closely.
The starting point of Spicer’s (2010) argument is the reality of VP, which 
he defines as “the idea that our moral values or conceptions of the good are 
many and varied and that we often find they come into conflict with one 
another in ways that do not permit any easy reconciliation or solution” 
(p. 18). Significantly, and confusingly, Spicer does not distinguish clearly 
between meta-ethical VP and moral diversity (cf. Spicer, 2010, Chapters 3, 
5). In his argument, VP refers to a particular structuring of genuine values as 
such, but also to the fact of moral diversity, that is, the existence and inter-
mingling of different moral outlooks. Borrowing his arguments explicitly 
from Berlin, he emphasizes the dangers of VM, arguing that “monist ways of 
acting and thinking” and the “monist approach to government” easily lead to 
incursions on freedom, oppression, and violence (pp. 18-19, 30-31, 50, 
63-64). Quoting Foucault, he even associates VM with fascism (p. 64). 
Throughout the book, moreover, Spicer focuses on VP as it figures in inter-
group relations. The idea that individuals (and groups sharing a common 
moral outlook) can also confront conflicts among their own basic values 
hardly plays a role in Spicer’s argument. VP is considered mostly as a source 
of social conflict that raises political, rather than psychological or simply 
ethical difficulties. For Spicer, the central question is how social groups 
endorsing conflicting values can live together peacefully within the same 
state.
Having made clear what VP means, Spicer proceeds to argue that VP 
implies certain political principles. In his view, VP suggests standards for 
what he calls “moral conduct by government” and requires “room for the 
pursuit of many of the different and conflicting values or moral ends that we 
have come to believe as important to us” (Spicer, 2010, p. 51). From this 
very general ethical demand, Spicer derives three more concrete political 
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principles (he distinguishes them less explicitly and less sharply than we 
do). First of all, there should be the “public pursuit of a broad range of moral 
ends” (pp. 50-51). This means that the different public actors in society 
should pursue the various (conflicting) values held by different groups in 
society, as opposed to the pursuit by these actors of a “narrow” set of values 
that excludes too many other moral ends.3 Second, there should be a signifi-
cant private sphere in which citizens can pursue a broad range of values as 
well (pp. 50-51). Third, Spicer says a recognition of VP necessitates efforts 
to promote civil peace. Too many values would be undermined when society 
is permeated by violent social conflict (pp. 49-52). Reversely, recognizing 
the plurality of conflicting values in public action may prevent the outbreak 
of social conflict. Spicer suggests that these three demands on the state (we 
call them the imperatives of inclusivity, personal liberty, and civil peace) are 
implied by the reality of VP. He continuously refers to these prescriptions as 
“pluralist,” but he provides little explanation why VP (either meta-ethical 
VP or moral diversity), considered by itself, has these normative implica-
tions. The argument seems to be that the conflicting values held by different 
members of society are all “true” and must therefore all be respected—and 
respect for them is best secured when the three described principles are 
adhered to.
Spicer subsequently argues that the political principles derived from VP 
are most likely met when the state is governed “politically.” Spicer uses the 
term politics to refer to a specific mode of governing, drawing particularly on 
Bernard Crick’s (1962) defense of politics and Stuart Hampshire’s (2000) 
theory of procedural justice. Following Crick, he defines politics as “a man-
ner of governance in which whoever happens to rule a society, be it a mon-
arch, an elected assembly, or some other body, attempts to reconcile the 
different interests and values that exist within that society by using methods 
of conciliation and compromise rather than force” (Spicer, 2010, p. 37; 
Spicer, 2007). To explain how conflict can be resolved peacefully, he further 
integrates his concept of politics with Hampshire’s theory of procedural jus-
tice. The universally shared idea of procedural justice, Spicer holds, is the 
principle of “hearing the other side” or “adversarial argument”: In the con-
flict resolution procedure, the conflicting parties must be allowed to make 
their case, after which their arguments are weighed and a binding judgment 
can be made. In the course of history, mankind has developed different modes 
of peaceful conflict resolution based on this fundamental principle of hearing 
the other side. On the societal level, in modern constitutional states at least, 
these modes are democratic politics and a well-functioning legal system 
(Spicer, 2010, pp. 70-80). Spicer argues that these systems of procedural jus-
tice promote the principles of inclusivity, personal freedom, and civil peace 
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in society. Both politics and the legal system allow “for the public expression 
of competing conceptions of the good. In doing so, while they cannot always 
guarantee that decisions reached will take account of these different concep-
tions, they make this more likely” (Spicer, 2010, p. 75).
Up to this point, Spicer’s argument has no obvious implications for public 
administration. Why should VP imply a defense of “politics in public adminis-
tration?” The last part of Spicer’s argument answers this question. Spicer 
argues that conventional parliamentary politics and the legal system together 
do not provide a sufficient degree of procedural justice within the state’s bind-
ing decision making. There is need for procedural justice and “politics” within 
administrative decisions and actions as well. Spicer offers two reasons for this 
position. The first is that the range of values pursued or affected in public policy 
depends not only on political decisions, but also on administrative decisions. 
Administrators (or at least some of them, sometimes) have in their professional 
role the capacity to promote or violate the principle of inclusivity (Spicer, 2010, 
pp. 31-35, 64). Because of this, administrative deliberations must be designed 
to include consideration of the widest possible range of citizens’ values, and 
must promote compromises between these values in administrative decision 
making. This design would have to be based on the principle of hearing the 
other side (Spicer, 2010, pp. 88-90). The second reason for (more) procedural 
justice within administrative deliberations is that it makes civil peace more 
secure. When citizens see that in decisions by public officials below the level 
of partisan politics the principle of hearing the other side is respected, they will 
more easily accept these decisions (Spicer, 2010, pp. 51, 89-90).
Spicer gives two relatively concrete prescriptions to expand procedural 
justice within administrative deliberations. First, he holds that administrators 
(at least in the United States) must consciously uphold the constitutional and 
political tradition, which requires procedural justice within administrative 
decision making. The principle of hearing the other side that is at work in this 
tradition, requires administrators to consider the views of various societal 
groups to create support for their actions (Spicer, 2010, pp. 84-89). Second, 
Spicer argues for ways to further the practice of hearing the other side within 
public organizations. This can be done by recruiting a workforce that is 
“diverse” in terms of social background and perspectives, and by promoting 
a culture of free discussion within the organization on its policies and guiding 
principles. To broaden the range of citizens’ values and interests considered 
in administrative decisions, administrators should try their best to have citi-
zens participate actively in administrative decisions that will affect them 
(Spicer, 2010, pp. 88-90).
In addition to his case for more procedural justice in public administration, 
Spicer believes VP may also provide a justification for political activism by 
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administrators. He argues that the conventional political process may pro-
duce decisions that go against the principles following from VP. Conventional 
politics (and the legal system) does not guarantee sufficiently “pluralist” poli-
cies. For example, a democratic majority might decide to restrict the religious 
freedom of a minority. Spicer (2010) claims it is “far from clear” that in such 
cases “public administrators should allow themselves simply to serve as pas-
sive instruments to promote the particularistic ends or values promoted by 
any one particular group of elected political actors” and execute decisions 
that “give insufficient weight to the values held to be important by other 
groups in society” (p. 87). Administrators have the responsibility, he seems to 
suggest, to hinder violations of the political principles derived from VP. 
However, this prescription is softened (indeed almost loses its force) by his 
qualification that, “[o]f course, administrators should follow the law as 
enacted by their political superiors and as interpreted by the courts” (Spicer, 
2010, p. 87).
In sum, we see that the administrative theorists Wagenaar and Spicer 
have derived diverging but far-reaching implications from VP. The former 
claims that because of VP, both academics and practitioners in public 
administration should give up their attempts to develop coherent moral 
theories and policy theories and instead adopt a practice-based approach to 
administrative ethics and an interpretivist approach to policy analysis and 
policy making. The latter argues that because of VP, the study of public 
administration should adopt a constitutional approach and orient itself less 
toward positivist social science and more toward history and political phi-
losophy. In practice, VP implies that governments (and particularly public 
administrators) should promote inclusivity, personal liberty, and civil peace 
and that principles of procedural justice should be maintained and expanded 
in administrative action.
Evaluation
After a description of the meaning of VP and its application by two promi-
nent adherents in public administration theory, we now come to our evalua-
tive part. As said before, we will here assume, for the sake of the argument, 
that VP is correct and that the meaning of its five elements is unambiguous. 
If so assumed, does it have the implications Wagenaar and Spicer claim it 
has? As we will see, there are many obstacles on the road to a positive answer. 
We will probe the positions of Wagenaar and Spicer by offering counterargu-
ments to various steps in their argument, starting with the implications drawn 
from VP in moral and political philosophy in general and then proceed to 
administrative theory proper.
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VP and Moral and Political Philosophy
The most immediate major problem for theorists employing VP is that argu-
ably no normative implications can be derived from VP at all. The reason is 
that VP is a descriptive theory about how the moral universe is structured and 
thus entails a set of factual claims: Moral values are irreducibly plural and 
often conflicting, even incommensurable. But as Hume has famously taught, 
no evaluative conclusion (“ought”) can be validly derived from a set of purely 
factual premises (“is”). Doing so entails the logical error known as the “natu-
ralistic fallacy.” This means that from VP alone, no normative implications 
can be derived. Just as the theory of gravity as such does not imply a prohibi-
tion to push somebody off the stairs, nor a duty for airlines to use reliable 
planes, likewise VP as such does not imply anything about what should be the 
case. The importance of this “is/ought” problem in value pluralist arguments 
in political and administrative theory must be stressed (Talisse, 2010). Before 
being able to derive any implications from VP, one has to stipulate (or better 
still, argue) that VP does indeed have normative implications. This is usually 
neglected, however, not only by moral philosophers, but also by administra-
tive theorists like Wagenaar and Spicer.
But let us proceed and grant for a moment that normative implications can 
indeed be derived from VP (either because Hume’s law need not be taken too 
strictly, or because VP is after all not purely descriptive, or for some other rea-
son). Even if this is permitted, these normative implications need not necessarily 
be political ones. After all, VP is primarily a notion in meta-ethics, not in politi-
cal philosophy.4 There is no clear reason why VP, if true, should have any con-
sequences for collective decision making, for the authoritative allocation of 
values, or for politics in any other accepted meaning of the term. In this connec-
tion, it tends to be forgotten that VP is not about moral diversity in society, but 
about the diversity and disunity of moral values as such. Many VP theorists, 
including Wagenaar and Spicer, easily slide from meta-ethical VP to societal 
moral diversity without noticing. Spicer in particular, but Wagenaar too, tends to 
suggest that the condition of moral diversity in modern multicultural Western 
societies is the same as VP. These are, however, two different things, and not 
obviously related. Indeed, there could very well be moral diversity in the world 
even if the VP thesis were false and VM true—people could mistakenly hold 
different sets of conflicting values. And vice versa, even in perfectly homoge-
neous societies in which all people accept the same set of values, VP can still be 
true. In other words, VP is a meta-ethical idea and its normative implications (if 
any) will be abstract and bear on philosophy rather than politics. No doubt, mod-
ern governments do have to deal with a considerable and perhaps growing 
amount of moral diversity in their societies, but that is not a consequence of VP.
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But again, let us suppose that we can responsibly derive certain practical, 
political implications from VP. Even if this is granted, it must be acknowl-
edged that these implications need not be liberal, or pragmatist, or even dem-
ocratic ones. Both Wagenaar and Spicer tend to link VP to such rather specific 
ideological positions, but without much argument. To begin with Spicer, he 
argues that VP implies the obligation for the state to respect the personal 
liberty of its citizens and links VP to political pluralism, constitutionalism, 
and liberalism. He offers little argument, however, why VP has these implica-
tions. This is unfortunate, because there is a notable debate going on in cur-
rent political philosophy whether VP has any political–ideological implication 
whatsoever, and in particular whether it is positively related to liberalism (cf. 
Cherniss & Hardy, 2010, §§ 4.4, 5.4; Neal, 2009). Let us briefly consider this 
debate.
The argument that VP entails liberalism originated with Berlin (e.g., 
Berlin, 1998b, 2002) and has recently been revived by Galston (2002) and 
Crowder (1998, 2002), in particular. They argue from the assumption of VP 
to the requirement for the state to allow its citizens the free pursuit of the 
values they espouse, that is, liberalism. Monism, in this view, justifies repres-
sive politics and violence to achieve a political order without disharmony of 
values. The claimed liberal implications of VP have, however, also been criti-
cized, in particular by Gray (1996), Kekes (1997), and Talisse (2010, 2011, 
2012). The basic problem they point out is that liberalism itself prioritizes 
certain values (e.g., freedom of choice) over others (cf. Chang, 2001). This 
prioritization is, however, not mandated by VP, which recognizes many val-
ues beyond liberal ones and states that these values can conflict with each 
other. To cite Talisse (2010),
Any attempt to explain why the state must respect the desire for free choice will 
invoke some value that the state must recognize as overriding, and any account 
of why the state must recognize this value rather than others will presuppose a 
rank-ordering of values, thereby violating value pluralism. (p. 310)
Talisse’s point here is not that VP is incompatible with liberalism, but 
rather that VP does not imply liberalism.5 It is neutral toward liberal and non-
liberal values, which are both part of the plurality of incommensurable val-
ues. Any argument that VP has the purported liberal implications founders on 
this neutrality (Talisse, 2010, p. 320; cf. Gray, 1996, p. 154).
The same is true of other ideological positions. Turning to Wagenaar 
(2002), we see that he also claims that “political pluralism issues from value 
pluralism” and that “political pluralism is value pluralism as it expresses 
itself in the real world of politics and collective problem solving” (p. 294). 
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But whereas for Spicer this leads to a recognizably liberal position, Wagenaar 
seems more inclined to a pragmatist and critical position. He argues that 
“political pluralism has to make its case against powerful monist propensi-
ties,” such as the appeals by “ruling elites” to consensus and reasonableness 
(Wagenaar, 2011, p. 294). Against political injustice and power abuse, 
Wagenaar proposes a conception of political pluralism and emancipatory 
progressivism. Again, however, it is far from clear how VP can warrant this 
highly political position. As Talisse and Aikin (2005a) have convincingly 
argued, pragmatists and progressivists cannot be consistent value pluralists 
any more than liberals can be.6
Reviewing the current debates, we conclude that the connection between 
VP and any political ideology is questionable. With reference to VP (or VM, 
for that matter), one can defend any substantive position (liberal or illiberal, 
progressive or conservative, even peaceful or violent) and VP itself provides 
no way, given value incompatibility and incommensurability, to argue the 
moral worth of one over the other. The move from VP to any ideological posi-
tion, including those of Wagenaar and Spicer, seems unwarranted.
VP and Administrative Theory
So far, our evaluation of arguments about the supposed implications of VP 
has been limited to the realms of moral and political philosophy. But we can 
go further and proceed to the field of administrative theory proper. Here our 
main point would be that, even if we grant, again, that VP can have normative 
and indeed particular political or ideological implications (as discussed 
above), these implications are not necessarily the specific implications for 
administrative thought and practice Wagenaar and Spicer claim to follow. 
The reason is that their positions are neither exhaustive nor congruent with 
one another.
First of all, the implications of VP for public administration defended by 
Wagenaar and Spicer do not exhaust the possibilities: Rather than necessitat-
ing their particular views, VP combines with other positions as well. An 
important figure in this connection is Max Weber. When it comes to his 
endorsement of VP, he is often considered a theoretical predecessor of Berlin. 
As Gray writes, there is a notable overlap between Weber’s and Berlin’s 
thought: “[I]f there is an explicit anticipation of Berlinian value-pluralism to 
be found anywhere, it is in Weber’s thought” (Gray, 1996, p. 58; cf. Cherniss 
& Hardy, 2010, §4.2). However, Weber’s views cannot easily be regarded 
very liberal, because of his nationalism and support for plebiscitary (“Caesar”-
like) leadership (Beetham, 1974, pp. 231-237; Weber, 1994, pp. 350-352). 
Nor is his position with regard to the responsibility of public administrators 
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very comparable with those of Wagenaar and Spicer. To this patron saint of 
political supremacy and administrative subordination, calls for “politics in 
public administration” and for intuitive, dialogical policy making by admin-
istrators would be anathema. The case of Weber alone suffices to prove that 
an endorsement of VP need not lead to the positions held by Wagenaar and 
Spicer at all: Their positions are not exhaustive.
Second, their positions are not congruent. That is to say, their arguments 
cannot be held simultaneously without inconsistency. We have seen that 
Wagenaar rejects proceduralism and rational deliberation about moral ends 
and is very critical about pleas for rational deliberation and also about setting 
up rules and procedures—but this is exactly what Spicer proposes with his 
notions of “hearing the other side” and “procedural justice.” Interestingly, 
among the “monist propensities” Wagenaar (2011) condemns, he also men-
tions “trust in the adjudicating power of a set of democratic procedures to 
resolve societal conflict” (p. 294). This is of course an apt formulation of 
what Spicer, following Hampshire, proposes. For him, deliberation to come 
to a reasonable, collective decision is precisely what politics is about. 
Wagenaar, however (like Weber and many other VP theorists), thinks we 
should give up on rational deliberation about ends. Because there are many 
intrinsic but rivaling values, they suggest, rational deliberation leads to 
nowhere and agents should just cut the knot. Although cautious in his formu-
lations, Wagenaar accepts that in everyday work the knots are indeed cut, 
within the context of a practice, on the basis of intuition and experience (see 
“Wagenaar’s argument” subsection above). The upshot must be that, if the 
implications of VP are indeed those of Wagenaar, they cannot be those of 
Spicer too, and vice versa. Their positions are incongruent, because, ulti-
mately, Wagenaar and Spicer disagree on the rationality of politics and 
administration.
To put this somewhat schematically, we could say that adherents of VP in 
the subfield of administrative theory seem to face a trilemma which prevents 
them from accepting the positions of Wagenaar, Spicer, and Weber at the 
same time. When they try to argue (with Wagenaar and Spicer) that VP 
implies an important moral role for administrators in public policy making 
and politics, they have to exclude Weber’s emphasis on the primacy of poli-
tics over administration and the strictly subordinate role of the latter. When 
they want to claim (with Weber and Wagenaar) that VP necessitates an intui-
tive, non-rational mode of public decision making, they have to bracket 
Spicer’s reliance on proceduralism and constitutionalism. And when, finally, 
they want to defend (with Spicer and Weber) the position that VP necessitates 
a course of neutrality between different societal interests, they have to silence 
Wagenaar’s call for a critical and emancipatory politics.
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So we must conclude that the positions defended by Wagenaar and Spicer 
are neither exhaustive for administrative theory, nor congruent to each other. 
In other words, starting from VP, one can end up in a whole range of posi-
tions. Among those who, confronted with the reality of moral dilemmas in 
public administration, advocate the pluralism of values, we see a pluralism of 
theoretical positions.
Conclusion: Little Guidance
In this article, we have examined the alleged implications of VP for adminis-
trative theory and practice. After discussing the idea of VP as such, we have 
first reconstructed and then evaluated the arguments of two administrative 
theorists (Wagenaar and Spicer) about the moral and political implications of 
VP in general and those for public administration in particular. Before drawing 
conclusions, we should note that although many moral and political (and some 
administrative) theorists accept VP as true, the notion is not uncontested. The 
controversy between value pluralists and value monists is far from settled (cf. 
Mason, 2011). Be this as it may, here the central question was whether VP, 
assumed to be true, implies the moral prescriptions for public administration 
ascribed to it by administrative theorists Wagenaar and Spicer. To this ques-
tion, we have answered that the implications are neither logical (they do not 
follow), nor exhaustive (other implications are also possible), nor congruent 
(they do not match to each other). So we conclude that the idea of VP, taken 
by itself, does not necessarily lead to the prescriptions that Wagenaar and 
Spicer claim to derive from it. Their claims are indefensible, or rather only 
defensible after a long string of concessions which not many will be ready to 
make. In the arena of administrative theory, VP cannot properly be used in this 
way. VP, taken alone, does not suffice as the normative foundation in an argu-
ment for or against administrative moral decision, procedural justice, a politi-
cal role for administration, and other contested topics.
Worse, the implications defended by Wagenaar and Spicer are only desir-
able if we also accept their particular set of values, that is, their moral and 
ideological choices. To assume that these are the most preferable values, as 
they effectively do, is to abandon VP. As noted, Spicer (2010) himself 
acknowledges at one point that there is no logical or necessary link between 
VP and the political pluralism he espouses (pp. 51-52).5 This is a remarkable 
admission, because it means that his own moral prescriptions for public 
administration are not based on VP, after all. The chain of argumentation does 
not start with VP, but with the assumed priority of some objective values over 
others; and this specific prioritization can never be legitimized by VP. 
Wagenaar, too, makes certain (politically inspired) choices for some values 
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over others. This is most clear when he argues for a critical, emancipatory 
position in policy analysis and policy making. Thus, Spicer and Wagenaar 
both do what they accuse others of, namely, putting some substantive values 
permanently over others. They fight an enemy not simply of their own cre-
ation but one that is remarkably like themselves. They are not so much straw-
man fighting as shadow-fighting.
Although administrative theorists and practitioners have to think through 
the moral dilemmas they study and face, VP as such provides little guidance 
for dealing with them. As Nieuwenburg (2004) once concluded, “What, then, 
does Berlin’s heroic pluralism have to tell us by way of practical advice for 
the conduct of life? There appears to be a quite straightforward answer to this 
question: Not much. . . . [P]luralism is a diagnosis rather than a guideline for 
action” (p. 692). VP offers an account of the way in which values relate to 
each other, which (if true) illuminates our moral situation. It can, in its less 
metaphysical meaning, also alert us to the pervasiveness and stickiness of 
value conflict in social and administrative life. But it does not, by itself, state 
that our moral situation is problematic, let alone suggest remedies for it. 
Hence, also after the contributions discussed here, the implications of VP for 
public administration (if any) are still open to debate.
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Notes
1. Book reviews of both Spicer (2010; e.g., Harmon, 2011; Reed, 2011; Vick, 2011) 
and Wagenaar (2011; e.g., Heayley, 2011; Ventriss, 2012) lack thorough exami-
nations of the claimed implications of value pluralism (VP).
2. “Values,” for Berlin, “are ideas about what is good to be and do—about what 
sort of life, what sort of character, what sort of actions, what state of being it is 
desirable to aspire to” (Cherniss & Hardy, 2010, §4 n.15).
3. We thank professor Spicer for clarifying this point (private e-mail exchange, 
October 10, 2011).
4. More than Spicer, Wagenaar (2011) shows an awareness of this gap: “Value 
pluralism is an ethical theory and consequently it moves in the rarefied realm 
of abstract philosophical argument. Political pluralism deals with the everyday 
world of politics” (p. 294).
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5. Spicer (2010) acknowledges this point himself:
[T]here is [not] necessarily any logical link between value pluralism and the 
sort of political pluralism that is implicit in our traditional ideas and practices 
of politics. One cannot, on the basis of value pluralism alone, logically rule 
out the use of force and violence as an acceptable and necessary means of 
resolving conflicts among moral ends . . . to do so would itself be to advocate 
a form of monism. (pp. 51-52)
Here, he denies that VP logically entails liberalism. A preference for liberalism is 
based not on VP, but on a subjective value commitment. Unfortunately, Spicer ignores 
this insight in the rest of his book. He consistently calls his liberal political positions 
“value pluralist.”
6. But see also Eldridge (2005) and other responses in the same volume, as well as 
the reply in Talisse and Aikin (2005b).
References
Beetham, D. (1974). Max Weber and the theory of modern politics. London: George 
Allen & Unwin.
Bellamy, R. (1999). Liberalism and pluralism: Towards a politics of compromise. 
London, UK: Routledge.
Bellamy, R. (2000). Rethinking liberalism. London, UK: Pinter.
Berlin, I. (1980). Vico and the ideal of the enlightenment. In H. Hardy (Ed.), Against 
the current (pp. 120-129). New York, NY: Viking Press.
Berlin, I. (1998a). The pursuit of the ideal. In H. Hardy & R. Hausheer (Eds.), The 
proper study of mankind: An anthology of essays (pp. 1-16). London, UK: 
Pimlico.
Berlin, I. (1998b). Two concepts of liberty. In H. Hardy & R. Hausheer (Eds.), The 
proper study of mankind: An anthology of essays (pp. 191-242). London, UK: 
Pimlico.
Berlin, I. (1998c). The originality of Machiavelli. In H. Hardy & R. Hausheer (Eds.), 
The proper study of mankind: An anthology of essays (pp. 269-325). London, 
UK: Pimlico.
Berlin, I. (1998d). Herder and the enlightenment. In H. Hardy & R. Hausheer (Eds.), 
The proper study of mankind: An anthology of essays (pp. 359-435). London, 
UK: Pimlico.
Berlin, I. (2002a). Liberty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berlin, I. (2002b). My intellectual path. In H. Hardy (Ed.), The power of ideals  
(pp. 1-23). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Berlin, I, & Williams, B. (1994). Pluralism and liberalism: A reply. Political Studies, 
42, 306-309.
Chang, R. (2001). Value pluralism. In N. J. Smelser (Ed.), International encyclope-
dia of the social & behavioral sciences (pp. 16139-16145). doi:10.1016/B0-08-
043076-7/01062-7
 at Universiteit Leiden \ LUMC on October 13, 2014aas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Overeem and Verhoef 1007
Cherniss, J., & Hardy, H. (2010). Isaiah Berlin. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2010 ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2010/entries/berlin
Crick, B. (1962). In defense of politics. London, UK: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.
Crowder, G. (1994). Pluralism and liberalism. Political Studies, 42, 293-305.
Crowder, G. (1998). From value pluralism to liberalism. Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, 1(3), 2-17.
Crowder, G. (2002). Liberalism and value pluralism. London, UK: Continuum.
Denhardt, K. G. (1988). The ethics of public service: Resolving moral dilemmas in 
public organizations. Westport, CT: Greenwood.
Eldridge, M. (2005). Why a pragmatist may be a pluralist. Transactions of the Charles 
S. Peirce Society, 41, 119-122.
Galston, W. A. (2002). Liberal pluralism: The implications of value pluralism for 
political theory and practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Gray, J. (1996). Isaiah Berlin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hampshire, S. (2000). Justice is conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Harmon, M. M. (2011). [Review of In defense of politics in public administration: A 
value pluralist perspective, Michael W. Spicer]. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 
33, 143-148.
Hausheer, R. (1980). Introduction. In I. Berlin (Ed.), Against the current (pp. xiii-liii). 
New York, NY: Viking Press.
Hausheer, R. (1998). Introduction. In H. Hardy & R. Hausheer (Eds.), The proper 
study of mankind: An anthology of essays (pp. xxiii-xxxvi). London, England: 
Pimlico.
Heayley, P. (2011). [Review of Meaning in action: Interpretation and dialogue in 
policy analysis, by H. C. Wagenaar]. Planning Theory & Practice, 12, 643-647.
Hsieh, N. (2008). Incommensurable values. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2008 ed.). Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
fall2008/entries/value-incommensurable
Kekes, J. (1993). The morality of pluralism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press.
Kekes, J. (1997). Against liberalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Langford, J. W. (2004). Acting on values: An ethical dead end for public servants. 
Canadian Public Administration, 47, 429-450.
Mason, E. (2011). Value pluralism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Retrieved from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/value-pluralism
Neal, P. (2009). Editors’ symposium: The path between value pluralism and lib-
eral political order: Questioning the connection. San Diego Law Review, 46, 
859-925.
Nieuwenburg, P. (2004). The agony of choice: Isaiah Berlin and the phenomenology 
of conflict. Administration & Society, 35, 683-700.
O’Kelly, C., & Dubnick, M. J. (2006). Taking tough choices seriously: Public admin-
istration and individual moral agency. Journal of Public Administration Research 
& Theory, 16, 393-415.
 at Universiteit Leiden \ LUMC on October 13, 2014aas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
1008 Administration & Society 46(8)
Reed, C. M. (2011). [Review of In defense of politics in public administration: A 
value pluralist perspective, by Michael W. Spicer]. The American Review of 
Public Administration, 41, 348-349.
Spicer, M. W. (2001). Value pluralism and its implications for American public 
administration. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 23, 507-528.
Spicer, M. W. (2004). Public Administration, the history of ideas, and the Reinventing 
Government movement. Public Administration Review, 64, 353-362.
Spicer, M. W. (2005a). Determinism, social science, and public administration: Lessons 
from Isaiah Berlin. American Review of Public Administration, 35, 256-269.
Spicer, M. W. (2005b). Public administration enquiry and social science in the post-
modern condition: Some implications of value pluralism. Administrative Theory 
& Praxis, 27, 669-688.
Spicer, M. W. (2007). Politics and the limits of a science of governance: Some reflec-
tions on the thought of Bernard Crick. Public Administration Review, 67, 768-779.
Spicer, M. W. (2008). The history of ideas and normative research in public admin-
istration: Some personal reflections. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 30, 50-70.
Spicer, M. W. (2010). In defense of politics in public administration: A value pluralist 
perspective. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press.
Talisse, R. B. (2010). Does value pluralism entail liberalism? Journal of Moral 
Philosophy, 7, 303-320.
Talisse, R. B. (2011). Value pluralism and liberal politics. Ethical Theory and Moral 
Practice, 14, 87-100.
Talisse, R. B. (2012). Pluralism and liberal politics. New York, NY: Routledge.
Talisse, R. B., & Aikin, S. F. (2005a). Why pragmatists cannot be pluralists. 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 41, 101-118.
Talisse, R. B., & Aikin, S. F. (2005b). Still searching for a pragmatist pluralism. 
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, 41, 145-160.
Van der Wal, Z., & van Hout, E. T. J. (2009). Is public value pluralism paramount? 
The intrinsic multiplicity and hybridity of public values. International Journal of 
Public Administration, 32, 220-231.
Ventriss, C. (2012). [Review of Meaning in action: Interpretation and dialogue in pol-
icy analysis, by H. C. Wagenaar]. Administrative Theory & Praxis, 34, 287-304.
Vick, D. (2011). [Review of Politics and public administration: What is the appropri-
ate relationship?, by M. W. Spicer]. Public Administration Review, 71, 811-812.
Wagenaar, H. C. (1999). Value pluralism in public administration. Administrative 
Theory and Praxis, 21, 441-449.
Wagenaar, H. C. (2002). Value pluralism in public administration: Two perspectives 
on administrative morality. In J. Jun (Ed.), Rethinking administrative theory: The 
challenge of the New Century 105-130. London, UK: Praeger.
Wagenaar, H. C. (2011). Meaning in action: Interpretation and dialogue in policy 
analysis. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Weber, M. (1994 [1919]). The profession and vocation of politics. In: Political writ-
ings (Lassman & Speirs eds., pp. 309-369). Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
 at Universiteit Leiden \ LUMC on October 13, 2014aas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Overeem and Verhoef 1009
Williams, B. (1978). Introduction. In H. Hardy (Ed.), I. Berlin, Concepts and 
Categories: Philosophical Essays (pp. xi-xviii). London, UK: Hogarth Press.
Williams, B. (1981). Conflicts of values. In B. Williams (Ed.), Moral luck  
(pp. 71-82). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Author Biographies
Patrick Overeem is an assistant professor at the Institute of Public Administration, 
Leiden University, the Netherlands. His areas of research include political philoso-
phy, administrative ethics, the constitutional legitimacy of public administration, and 
political-administrative relations. His work has been published in Administration & 
Society, Public Administration Review, and Administrative Theory & Praxis, among 
others.
Jelle Verhoef is a former management consultant and currently a civil service trainee 
at the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, The Hague. He took degrees in both 
Political Science and Public Administration, and did research on value pluralism in 
administrative theory.
 at Universiteit Leiden \ LUMC on October 13, 2014aas.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
